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a b s t r a c t
Liaw proposed a broadcasting cryptosystem [H.T. Liaw, Broadcasting cryptosystem in
computer networks, Computers & Mathematics with Applications 37 (Mar. 1999) 85–87]
which claims to involve fewer broadcasting messages, and has attracted quite some
research efforts on iterative analysis and improvement [H.M. Sun, Security of broadcasting
cryptosystem in computer networks, Electronics Letters 35 (Nov. 1999) 2108–2109;
Y.M. Tseng, J.K. Jan, Cryptanalysis of Liaw’s broadcasting cryptosystem, Computers &
Mathematics with Applications 41 (Jun. 2001) 1575–1578; J.M. Masque, A. Peinado,
Cryptanalysis of improved Liaw’s broadcasting cryptosystem, Journal of Information
Science and Engineering 22 (Mar. 2006) 391–399]. We show that the redefined Liaw’s
broadcasting cryptosystem recently presented in [J.M. Masque, A. Peinado, Cryptanalysis
of improved Liaw’s broadcasting cryptosystem, Journal of Information Science and
Engineering 22 (Mar. 2006) 391–399] is still insecure in that an unauthorized user is able
to obtain the shared secret, which is only intended for certain privileged users.
© 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
We consider the secure broadcasting problem of distributing a common shared secret, typically a symmetric session key
sk, to a privileged group G of intended receivers. We assume that G ⊆ {Ui}ni=1 is a subset of the universal user set consisting
of n stateless users. In this scenario, encrypting the application data with the common shared secret sk enables a secure
communication channel from a sender to the group G of authorized users; only these legitimate recipients should be able
to recover the application data from the sender with the session key sk, while any unauthorized user Ui 6∈ G should not.
Designing a secure broadcasting cryptosystem has proved to be a non-trivial task. In [1] Liaw proposed one such scheme,
which claims to involve fewer broadcasting messages when distributing the session key sk, known as the rekey messages.
However, in [2] it is shown that in order to meet the desired security, the operation of Liaw’s scheme becomes actually
infeasible because a prohibitively large amount of information (∼271 bits)must be kept by each user, and be sent as the rekey
message for each broadcast. On the other hand, in [3] it is revealed that Liaw’s broadcasting cryptosystem is susceptible to the
conspiracy attack, and an improved scheme is also proposed for fixing this vulnerability. Nonetheless, recently [4] reported
an inconsistency in the improvement, indicating that the improved Liaw’s broadcasting cryptosystem [3] actually does not
work due to incorrect arithmetic. Moreover, new security breaches of the original Liaw’s scheme [1] are discovered in [4].
To counter all the old [3] and new [4] attacks as well as the performance issue pinpointed in [2], the authors of [4] presented
a redefined Liaw’s scheme, claiming to have solved all the various problems.
In this letter, we show that in spite of all these efforts [1–4], the redefined Liaw’s scheme [4] is still inapplicable, as it
unfortunately fails to meet the rudimentary requirement for a secure broadcasting cryptosystem. That is, in the redefined
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scheme [4], any unauthorized user Ui 6∈ G can actually obtain the session key sk, which is a secret only intended for the
privileged group G.
As the original Liaw’s scheme [1] has been found highly problematic [2–4] and the improved Liaw’s scheme [3] proved
to be technically flawed [4], in the next section we only briefly review the redefined Liaw’s scheme [4]. Then we present
an analysis to show that the redefined broadcasting cryptosystem does not achieve the fundamental design goal, which is
followed by our concluding remarks.
2. Review of the redefined Liaw’s broadcasting cryptosystem
To review the redefined Liaw’s scheme [4], we follow the same notation as in [1–4]. We consider a system composed of
n users {U}ni=1 under the coordination of a trusted central authority server (CAS). The algorithm involved is based on some
RSA-like arithmetic.
Let N = pq be a public modulus, where p = 2p′ + 1, q = 2q′ + 1, and p, q, p′, q′ are all large prime numbers. Let
λ(N) = lcm(p − 1, q − 1) = lcm(2p′, 2q′) = 2p′q′, which is a divisor of φ(N), the Euler totient function. In the redefined
scheme, an encryption function f (x) = xe mod λ(N) is employed, and two exponents e and d are chosen by the CAS such
that ed ≡ 1(mod φ(λ(N))). The CAS chooses a system key K0 ∈ Zn and a random number rc . For each user Ui, 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
the CAS selects a prime number ti such that t−1i mod λ(N) exists, and assigns to Ui a private key Ki and a public key Pi:
Ki = K ti0 mod N, (1)
Pi = f (t−1i rc) = (t−1i rc)e mod λ(N). (2)
For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, each private key Ki is sent to Ui over a secure channel, respectively, while d, N , and Pi are publicly known to
all. Note that e, K0, rc , {ti}ni=1, and any information on factorizing N are only known to the CAS.
Assume the user U1 wants to broadcast a message M to a group of users G = {Ui}ai=2, where a < n. The sender S = U1
first sends the user identities {Ui}ai=2 to the CAS, which constructs and then broadcasts a rekey message f (B):
B =
∏
Ui∈G∪{S}
ti mod N,
f (B) = Be mod λ(N). (3)
On receiving the rekey message f (B), both the sender S = U1 and the legitimate receivers G = {Ui}ai=2 derive the same
session key sk:
sk = K (f (B)Pi)di mod N
= K (B t
−1
i rc )
ed mod λ(N)
i mod N
= K B t
−1
i rc
i mod N = K B rc0 mod N. (4)
Then,U1 encrypts its messageM as C = Esk(M), which is broadcast and can then be decrypted by allUi |ai=2 ∈ G following
M = E−1sk (C).
3. Cryptanalysis of the redefined Liaw’s broadcasting cryptosystem
We show that in spite of all the efforts [1–4], the redefined Liaw’s scheme [4], technically correct in the arithmetic sense,
though fails to meet the elementary requirement for a secure broadcasting cryptosystem. That is, even an unauthorized
user Uj 6∈ G ∪ {S}, which is neither a member in the privileged group nor the sender, can actually obtain the session key
sk. The fault lies in that, although the broadcast rekey message f (B) is constructed as an encrypted form of the ‘‘G-aware’’ B
following (3), the derivation of the session key sk as depicted in (4) does not provide any protection against an unauthorized
user Uj, which also holds a valid private key Kj following (1) and a valid public key Pj following (2). To make this clear, we
show that Uj ∈ {Ui}ni=a+1 can simply derive the session key sk from the broadcast f (B), just like the sender S or any intended
receiver Ui ∈ G does:
sk = K (f (B)Pj)dj mod N
= K (B t
−1
j rc )
ed mod λ(N)
j mod N
= K B t
−1
j rc
j mod N = K B rc0 mod N.
This is the same session key as was computed by (4). Therefore, any Uj 6∈ G ∪ {S} can thus decrypt the ciphertext C from S
to recover the original messageM .
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4. Concluding remarks
In this letter, we show that the redefined Liaw’s scheme [4] even fails to meet the rudimentary requirement for a secure
broadcasting cryptosystem. Interestingly, we have identified a similar problem in a set of other schemes [5], where it seems
that consideration has been focused on the arithmetic correctness so much that the fundamental design goal of protecting
the session key from unauthorized users is overlooked.
We have also observed that the rekey message f (B) depicted in (3) is actually bounded by λ(N), which results in the
unusual property of exhibiting a constant message size |λ(N)| = |2p′q′| independent of n, the maximum number of the
users that the system can accommodate.We perceive that any broadcasting cryptosystem bearing such a property (i.e., with
a fixed-length rekey message) is either insecure (like the redefined Liaw’s scheme [4]) or impractical for real applications
(like the complete key graph scheme illustrated in [6]), while detailed analysis on this viewpoint is outside the scope of this
letter.
Finally, we remark that the revealed security breach in [4] cannot be remedied without a substantial redesign, possibly
from scratch, which is far beyond the scope of this letter. We also point out that it may not be a good strategy to design a
broadcasting cryptosystemwith asymmetric cryptology, as commonly adopted in the original [1], the improved [3], and the
redefined [4] Liaw’s schemes.
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